Calvin Shane Myers v. State of Utah : Brief of Appellee by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
Calvin Shane Myers v. State of Utah : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Steven B. Wall; Wall & Wall, P.C.; Scott H. York; Quintana & York, P.C.; Counsel for Appellant.
Christopher D. Ballard; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General;
Counsel for Appellee.
STEVEN B. WALL Wall & Wall, P.C. 5200 S. Highland Dr., Ste. 300 Salt Lake City, UT 84117
SCOTT H. YORK Quintana & York, P.C. 3341 S. 700 E. Salt Lake City, UT 84106 Counsel for
Appellant
CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD (8497) Assistant Attorney General MARK L. SHURTLEFF
(4666) Utah Attorney General 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor PO BOX 140854 Salt Lake City, UT
84114-0854 (801)366-0180 Counsel for Appellee
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Myers v. Utah, No. 20010955.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1965
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CALVIN SHANE MYERS, 
ramoner/ Appellant, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Case No. 20010955-SC 
APPEAL FROM U\¥ DENIAL Ot A PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF CHALLENGING PETITIONER'S CONVICTION FOR 
AGGRAVATED MURDER, A CAPITAL FELONY. N THF THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, SUM*"- ™ ^ ' ~ v T W U^N R AB11 ROBERT K. 
HILDER PRESIDING 
STEVEN B. WALL 
Wall & Wall, P ( 
5200 S. Highland Dr., Ste. 300 
Salt ' i keCi tv TTT S4117 
SCOTT IT YORK 
Quintana & York, P.C. 
3341 S '.'00 E. 
Salt Lake Citv "^ "4106 
CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD
 v8497; 
Assistant .Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLFI-F (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South. 6,h f-
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake ('it>. UT 84 i 14-0854 
(801) ^ 6 0180 
( • u n - • j.pUlee 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CALVIN SHANE MYERS, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/ Appellee. 
Case No. 20010955-SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM THE DENIAL OF A PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF CHALLENGING PETITIONER'S CONVICTION FOR 
AGGRAVATED MURDER, A CAPITAL FELONY, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, SUMMIT COUNTY, THE HONORABLE ROBERT K. 
HILDER PRESIDING 
STEVEN B. WALL 
Wall & Wall, P.C. 
5200 S. Highland Dr., Ste. 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
SCOTT H. YORK 
Quintana & York, P.C. 
3341 S. 700 E. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD (8497) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
(801)366-0180 
Counsel for Appellant Counsel for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW I 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 8 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE POST-CONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED 
PETITIONER'S FIRST THREE CLAIMS AS PROCEDURALLY 
BARRED BECAUSE PETITIONER RAISED THOSE SAME 
CLAIMSATTRIAL 10 
II. THE POST-CONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT 
PETITIONER'S TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE BY ADVISING PETITIONER TO ACCEPT THE 
STATE'S PLEA OFFER 14 
III. THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER PETITIONER'S 
UNPRESERVED VAGUENESS CLAIM; ALTERNATIVELY, 
PETITIONER WAIVED THE CLAIM BY PLEADING GUILTY; 
BUT IN ANY EVENT, PETITIONER FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE 
THAT THE STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE 19 
A. The Court should decline to review petitioner's 
unpreserved claim because he does not argue that plain 
error occurred or that exceptional circumstances existed 19 
B. Petitioner's guilty plea waived his vagueness challenge 21 
i 
C. The homicide statute is not unconstitutionally vague 
because it prohibits the killing of any life within the 
womb, including a nonviable fetus, other than through a 
legal abortion 23 
CONCLUSION 31 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A - U.S. Const, amend. XTV, § 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201 (1999) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1 )(b) (1999) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (1996) 
ADDENDUM B - Excerpts from 54th Legislature on S.B. 178 
n 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742(1970) 17 
Grayned v. City ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) 23 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 25 
Roev. Wade, 410U.S. 113(1973) 3, 10,20 
United States v. Burke, 694 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1982) 21 
United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 69 F.3d 1215 (1st Cir. 1995) 21 
STATE CASES 
Brinkleyv. State, 322 S.E.2d49(Ga. 1984) 25 
Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96,44 P.3d 626 18 
In re Discipline of Pendleton, 2000 UT 77,11 P.3d 284 16 
In re Estate of McLaughlin, 754 P.2d 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 13 
Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816 (Utah 1991) 22,23,26 
Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 55, 5 P.3d 616 24 
People v. Brown, 506 N.Y.S.2d 483 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) 22 
People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994) 16 
People v. Ford, 581 N.E.2d 1189 (111. App. Ct. 1991) 16 
Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002 UT 7,439 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 2,10 
State v. Black, 526N.W.2d 132 (Wis. 1994) 16 
iii 
State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, 455 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 2, 20 
State v. Coleman, 705 N.E.2d 419 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) 16 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) 20 
State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992) 20, 21 
State v. Frausto, 2002 UT App 259, 53 P.3d 486 20 
State v. Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) 16 
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 10P.3d346 19,20 
State v. LaRue, 619 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 2000) 22 
State v. Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1978) 27 
State v. Mem7/,450N.W.2d318(Minn. 1990) 16 
State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73,31 P.3d 547 23,24 
State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51,4 P.3d 778 15 
State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989) 21 
State v. Pecht, 2002 UT 41,48 P.3d 931 15, 18 
State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1995) 20 
State v. Robinson, 618 N.W.2d 306 (Iowa 2000) 21 
Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT 72,452 Utah Adv. Rep. 64 15 
Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787 (S.C. 1996) 16 
FEDERAL STATUTES 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 2 
iv 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201 (1999) 2,25,28 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202(1999) 2,3,4, 10, 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (Supp. 2001) 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 2001) 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1996) 13 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (1996) 2,10, 12, 13 
Utah Const, art. VIII § 5 13 
UtahR. App. P. 5 16 
v 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CALVIN SHANE MYERS, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
CaseNo.20010955-SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from the denial of a petition for post-conviction relief 
challenging a conviction for a capital felony. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
over appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs, except petitions challenging 
a conviction for a first degree or capital felony. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 
2001). Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)0) 
(Supp. 2001) (granting this court jurisdiction over orders for "which the Court of Appeals 
does not have original appellate jurisdiction"). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the post-conviction court correctly dismiss petitioner's claims as 
procedurally barred when petitioner raised identical claims at trial? 
2. Did the post-conviction court correctly find that trial counsel provided effective 
assistance by advising petitioner to accept the State's plea offer, when the pursuit of every 
other option posed a significant the risk that petitioner could receive the death penalty? 
Standard of Review. This Court will review "an appeal from an order dismissing 
or denying a petition for post-conviction relief for correctness without deference to the 
lower court's conclusions of law." Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002 UT 7, f 4, 439 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 8. 
3a. Did petitioner waive his claim that the homicide statute is unconstitutionally 
vague by failing to raise the claim below and failing to assert plain error or extraordinary 
circumstances on appeal? 
3b. Alternatively, can petitioner challenge the homicide statute as 
unconstitutionally vague when he waived the claim by pleading guilty? 
3c. Assuming petitioner had not waived his vagueness challenge, is the homicide 
statute's prohibition on killing an '"unborn child" unconstitutionally vague as applied to 
petitioner's killing of a sixteen-to-eighteen week-old fetus still in its mother's womb? 
Standard of Review. "*[I]ssues not raised at trial cannot be argued for the first 
time on appeal... unless the petitioner demonstrates that "plain error' occurred or 
"exceptional circumstances' exist'" State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, <f 70,455 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 25 (quoting Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017,1022 (Utah 1996!) (additional 
citations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, AND STATUTES 
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of the following provisions, whose 
text is reproduced in addendum A: 
U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, § 1; 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201 (1999); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1 )(b) (1999); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-106 (1996). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Trial Court Proceedings 
The State charged petitioner with two counts of aggravated murder, both capital 
felonies, for the murder of Irene Christensen and her unborn child. R. 294-95. Count one 
charged petitioner for the death of Ms. Christensen, aggravated by petitioner's killing of 
her unborn child in the same criminal episode. Id. Count two charged petitioner for the 
death of Ms. Christensen's unborn child, aggravated by petitioner's killing of Ms. 
Christensen. Id. 
Prior to his preliminary hearing, petitioner filed a motion to reduce or dismiss 
charges on the grounds that the fetus's death could not serve as an aggravating factor or 
as an independent count because Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and its progeny 
prevented the State from constitutionally recognizing a nonviable fetus as a person. R. 
53-74, 167. The magistrate denied the motion and bound petitioner over for trial. R. 167. 
In the district court, petitioner filed a motion to: (1) preclude application of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-202 to the killing of a fetus, or, in the alternative, to the killing of a 
nonviable fetus; (2) preclude the killing of the nonviable fetus as an aggravating factor in 
count I; and (3) dismiss either count I or count II of the information. R. 24-48, 162. The 
motion was based essentially on the same grounds as petitioner's prior motion. R. 24-48. 
The district court denied the motion. R. 156-57. 
Petitioner entered an unconditional guilty plea to one count of aggravated murder 
and the trial court dismissed the second count in accordance with the plea agreement. R. 
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286-92; 273-74. The trial court sentenced petitioner to life imprisonment with the 
possibility of parole. R. 269, 265-66. Petitioner never filed a motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea, nor did he seek a direct appeal. 
The Postconviction Proceedings 
Petitioner improperly filed his petition for post-conviction relief in this Court. R. 
126. This Court referred the petition to the third district court in Summit County because 
rule 65C(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, mandates the filing of petitions for post-
conviction relief in the "district court in the county in which the judgment of conviction 
was entered." 
Petitioner raised five issues in his petition: 
1. Is a sixteen week old, nonviable fetus a "person" as the terra is used in UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(l)(b)? 
2. Did the State meet its burden of proving the corpus delicti of the charged crime 
by clear and convincing evidence? 
3. Was the trial court without jurisdiction to commit Petitioner to life 
imprisonment for violating UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(l)(b) where the 
undisputed facts would not support a conviction for the charged offense? 
4. Did the failure of Petitioner's defense counsel to object to entry of plea or to 
appeal Petitioner's conviction amount to "ineffective assistance of counsel" 
sufficient to justify habeas corpus relief? 
5. Is die State of Utah improperly and unconstitutionally detaining the Petitioner? 
R. 113-14. 
The post-conviction court found that petitioner's first three claims were 
procedurally barred because he previously raised them at trial. R. 398-99. It also found 
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that petitioner's counsel was not ineffective and denied the petition. Id. Petitioner timely 
appealed. R. 402. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Petitioner's underlying criminal conviction arises from his guilty plea to the 
aggravated murder of Irene Christensen in December, 1994. R. 291-92. Petitioner knew 
that Christensen was pregnant when he stabbed her and slit her throat. R. 226, 184, 177, 
291. He explained that he killed Christensen because she '"broke into his old apartment 
and stole a bunch of stuff." R. 226-27. 
MYERS/CHRISTENSEN RELATIONSHIP 
Petitioner Calvin Shane Myers and Irene Christensen shared an apartment and a 
sexual relationship during the summer of 1994. R. 185-86. In July or August, 
Christensen told petitioner she was pregnant R. 184-84; 177-78. Petitioner didn't 
originally believe Christensen, but was convinced after she showed him some lab reports. 
R. 210, 226. He believed that Christensen was carrying his child, but he was scared 
because he did not feel he was responsible enough to have children. R. 184. 
Sometime during the evening of 2 December 1994 petitioner telephoned his friend 
Steven Howard to say he was on his way to Howard's apartment R. 209-10, 241. 
Petitioner and Howard got together after work almost every day. R. 215. Petitioner told 
Howard that Christensen would be also be coming. R. 209. Howard understood that 
Christensen was petitioner's ex-girlfriend. R. 211. 
1
 This fact statement is taken from petitioner's plea affidavit, R. 286-92, and the 
transcript of his preliminary hearing, R. 171-263. 
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PETITIONER ASKS FOR A KNIFE 
Petitioner and Christensen arrived at Howard's apartment around midnight. The 
three shared some cocktails. R. 182,240. While conversing over their drinks, petitioner 
got upset with Christensen because she had disparaged his intelligence. R. 182. 
Petitioner asked Howard if he had a knife and told Howard that he was going to kill 
Christensen. R. 240. At that point, Howard did not take petitioner seriously. Id. 
The three left Howard's apartment around 12:30 a m and drove towards Park City 
in petitioner's car. R. 181-82, 207-08, 238. It was snowing heavily. R. 195. Howard 
suggested pulling off the road to wait for a snow plow, but petitioner responded that 
everything would be fine. R. 194-95. The three eventually ended up at Rockport 
Reservoir State Park. R. 181,235-36. Petitioner drove into die park until he reached a 
dead end where the road had not been plowed. R. 235. 
The three got out of petitioner's car and walked towards the reservoir. R. 180, 
234. They looked at the stars while Howard and petitioner discussed the beauty of nature. 
Id. Petitioner and Christensen embraced and kissed. R. 205-06. 
"IT WAS A DIRTY JOB BUT SOMEBODY'S GOT TO DO IT" 
As the three stood at the edge of the reservoir Howard heard a moan and turned 
around. R. 204,233. At first he believed petitioner was punching Christensen. Id. Then 
he heard Christensen pleading "Please don't kill me. I love you." R. 232. Realizing that 
petitioner was actually stabbing Christensen, Howard fled back to the car. R. 231, 204. 
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Petitioner stabbed and sliced Christensen at least twelve times with the four-and-a-
half-inch blade of a rusty hunting knife. R. 193, 197-98,253. In one instance he stabbed 
her below the right breast, plunging the knife downward toward the center of her body 
into her abdomen and liver. R. 252. He stabbed her again on the right side of the chest, 
this time twisting and moving the knife inside her body until the blade passed completely 
through her liver. R. 251. 
Petitioner sliced Christensen's throat from the left to the right side of her neck 
severing her jugular vein and carotid artery and nearly decapitating her. R. 250. The 
medical examiner testified that Christensen's head ^ a s practically pulled off." Id. 
Petitioner left Christensen's body in a snowbank and returned to his car. R. 203, 
230, 259-60. He opened the trunk and wiped his hands on a towel, then got in the car and 
started driving back to Salt Lake. R. 230. He boasted to Howard, "It was a dirty job, but 
somebody's got to do it." R. 229. 
When Howard later asked petitioner why he killed Christensen, petitioner 
explained that "it was because she broke into his old apartment and stole a bunch of 
stuff." R. 200, 227. Petitioner also expressed to Howard that he regretted killing 
Christensen because she was pregnant R. 199-200,226. 
Although Howard and petitioner tried to avoid the subject of Christensen's murder, 
the two sometimes joked about it. 196-97, 223-25. They would make up jokes "using 
death or something like that as punch lines." R. 224. 
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A snowmobiler discovered Christensen's frozen body fifteen days later. R. 260-
62, 294. Investigators discovered Steven Howard's wallet approximately 400 feet from 
Christensen's body. R. 220-21, 254-57. Police contacted Howard and he eventually 
confessed his knowledge of Christensen's murder. R. 216-18. The police then contacted 
petitioner and he provided a taped confession after waiving his Miranda rights. R. 171-
91. 
A SIXTEEN- TO EIGHTEEN-WEEK-OLD MALE FETUS 
An autopsy revealed that Christensen was sixteen-to-eighteen weeks pregnant 
when petitioner murdered her. R. 249. The medical examiner removed a normally 
developed male fetus from her uterus. R. 242-43,248-49. The fetus was 7.7 inches long 
and its hands, fingers, and toes were normally developed for a fetus of its age. Id. The 
Medical Examiner testified that the fetus was alive immediately prior to the death of 
Christensen and died because Christensen died. R. 246-47. 
The medical examiner believed the fetus was probably not viable outside his 
mother's womb. R. 244. The medical examiner admitted, however, that while she did 
not personally know of a fetus this young being delivered, it might be possible. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Procedural Bar. The post-conviction court correctly dismissed petitioner's first 
three claims as procedurally barred because petitioner raised identical claims at trial. 
Petitioner cannot use collateral post-conviction proceedings as a substitute for direct 
appeal. 
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Ineffective Assistance. The post-conviction court correctly dismissed petitioner's 
claim of ineffective assistance because Mr. McCaughey provided petitioner with sound 
strategic advice. Petitioner faced a substantial risk of receiving the death penalty. By 
advising petitioner to accept the State's plea offer, Mr. McCaughey's strategy guaranteed 
that petitioner would escape the death penalty and instead receive a sentence of life with 
the possibility of parole. 
Vagueness. This Court should decline to review petitioner's claim that the term 
"unborn child" renders the homicide statute unconstitutionally vague because petitioner 
failed to raise the issue below and fails to argue on appeal that any exception to the 
preservation rule applies. Alternatively, petitioner waived his vagueness challenge when 
he entered his unconditional guilty plea. 
In any event, petitioner fails to demonstrate that the homicide statute is 
unconstitutionally vague. The legislature chose to use the unqualified term "unborn 
child," and also created an exception to the homicide statute for the killing of an "unborn 
child" through an abortion. Therefore, reading the statute as a whole, and giving effect to 
all of its terms, the legislature made it clear that the homicide statute prohibits the killing 
of any life within the womb, whether viable or not, unless through an abortion. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE POST-CONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED 
PETITIONER'S FIRST THREE CLAIMS AS PROCEDURALLY 
BARRED BECAUSE PETITIONER RAISED THOSE SAME 
CLAIMS AT TRIAL 
The Post-Conviction Remedies Act prohibits a petitioner from relitigating claims 
that he previously litigated at trial. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-106(l)(b) (1996). It 
states that "[a] person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that 
was raised or addressed at trial." Id. The policy behind this rule is clear and persuasive. 
When a petitioner litigates a claim at trial and loses, his remedy is to take a direct appeal, 
rather than using post-conviction proceedings as a substitute for appeal. See Rudolph v. 
Galetka, 2002 UT 7, % 5,439 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 ("A petition for post-conviction relief is a 
collateral attack on a conviction and sentence and is not a substitute for direct appellate 
review"). Because petitioner had already raised his first three post-conviction claims at 
trial, the post-conviction court correctly dismissed those claims as procedurally barred. 
Petitioner's first three post-conviction claims were identical to claims he raised at 
trial. Prior to his preliminary hearing, petitioner filed a motion to reduce or dismiss the 
charges because Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and its progeny prevented the State 
from constitutionally recognizing a nonviable fetus as an "unborn child," and therefore a 
human being under the homicide statute. R. 53-74,167. In the district court, petitioner 
filed a motion to: (1) preclude application of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 to the killing of 
a fetus, or, in the alternative, to the killing of a nonviable fetus; (2) preclude the killing of 
the nonviable fetus as an aggravating factor in count I; and (3) dismiss either count I or 
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count II of the information. R. 24-48, 162. The grounds for this motion were essentially 
identical to petitioner's previous motion. R. 24-48. 
Petitioner raised identical issues in his post-conviction petition. The first three 
claims he asserted were: 
1. Is a sixteen week old, nonviable fetus a "person" as the term is used in UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1 )(b)? 
2. Did the State meet its burden of proving the corpus delicti of the charged crime 
by clear and convincing evidence? 
3. Was the trial court without jurisdiction to commit Petitioner to life 
imprisonment for violating UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1 )(b) where the 
undisputed facts would not support a conviction for the charged offense? 
R. 113-14. The essence of these post-conviction claims was identical to petitioner's 
claims at trial. Indeed, petitioner admitted in his petition that "[djefense counsel's 
motions argued effectively the same point that is forwarded in this Petition; namely, that a 
nonviable fetus cannot meet the definition of a "person" as the term is used in U.C.A. § 
76-5-202(1 )(b)." R. 95. For example, petitioner argued in his petition that under Roe, 
"[t]he nonviable fetus is not a 'person' such that the State can either protect its 'life,' or 
express the most severe form of Legislative disapprobation over its death - capital 
punishment. It is disingenuous for the State to assert that no homicide at all is committed 
for the 'abortion' of a nonviable fetus, but in all other circumstances one faces murder or 
aggravated murder charges." R. 103. 
Petitioner's arguments regarding the trial court's jurisdiction and the corpus delicti 
rule were also premised on his argument that Roe prevented the State from criminalizing 
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the killing of a nonviable fetus. For example, he argued that the trial court did not have 
jurisdiction to convict or sentence him for aggravated murder because the killing of a 
nonviable fetus could not be a crime. R. 103. He explained that "it is plain legal error for 
the trial court to assert aggravated homicide jurisdiction solely on the killing of a 
nonviable fetus/' Id. He also reasoned that since a nonviable fetus could not be 
recognized as a person, the State had not proved the corpus delicti of aggravated murder 
because it had not proven that he killed two persons; rather it proved only that he had 
killed Ms. Christensen and a nonviable fetus. R. 97. For example, he asserted that "[tjhe 
State only submitted evidence that the victim Christensen and the nonviable fetus were 
killed. With this alone, the State had failed... in its corpus delicti burden/9 R. 97. 
These post-conviction claims were identical to petitioner's claims at trial. 
Therefore, the post-conviction court correctly dismissed these claims as procedurally 
barred under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-106(l)(b) 
(1996). 
Petitioner asserts that he properly raised his claim in this collateral attack because 
his claims attacked die trial court's jurisdiction. Br. of Aplt. at 22. Petitioner's claims, 
however, are issues of statutory interpretation, not jurisdictional questions. If the trial 
court misinterpreted die homicide and aggravated murder statutes it did not lose 
jurisdiction over petitioner. 
In any event, the trial court had jurisdiction over petitioner's case. A trial court 
has subject matter jurisdiction over a case when it is one of the type of cases that the 
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constitution or a statute empowers it to hear. In re Estate of McLaughlin, 754 P.2d 679, 
681-82 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 11 (1982)). 
Contrary to petitioner's allegations, proof of the corpus delicti is not required to establish 
subject matter jurisdiction. Rather, a trial court derives its subject matter jurisdiction 
from the Utah Constitution and the Utah Code. Id. The Utah Constitution provides that 
"[t]he district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by this 
constitution or by statute . . ." Utah Const, art. VIII § 5. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) 
(1996), states that "[t]he district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and 
criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law." The action 
that petitioner challenged in his petition was a criminal case, the type of case that the 
Utah Constitution and Code empowered the trial court to entertain. McLaughlin, 754 
P.2d at 681-82. Therefore, any jurisdictional challenge was frivolous-
Petitioner also claims that the exception in section 78-35a-106(2) should have 
excused the procedural bar and allowed him to proceed with his claims. Br. of Aplt. at 
24. Petitioner misreads the language of the statute. Section 78-35a-106(2) states that 
"[notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that 
the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise 
that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-
106(2). The provision excuses a procedural bar based on a petitioner's failure to raise a 
claim at trial or on appeal. It does not apply to claims—like petitioner's—that are barred 
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because they were actually raised at trial or on appeal. Accordingly, section 78-35a-
106(2) does not excuse the procedural bar. 
II. THE POST-CONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT 
PETITIONER'S TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE BY ADVISING PETITIONER TO ACCEPT THE 
STATE'S PLEA OFFER 
Factual Background. Petitioner's trial counsel, Stephen McCaughey, filed two 
motions arguing that the State could not constitutionally recognize the killing of a 
nonviable fetus as murder. R. 24-48, 53-48. Both motions were denied. R. 156-57, 167. 
Prior to trial, the State offered to dismiss the second count of aggravated murder and not 
seek the death penalty or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole if petitioner 
would enter an unconditional guilty plea to the first charge of aggravated murder. R. 281-
82,286-92. Mr. McCaughey advised petitioner to accept the offer and petitioner 
followed that advice. Id. Petitioner never sought to withdraw his unconditional guilty 
plea or appeal his conviction or sentence* 
Analysis. Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was ineffective because he 
advised petitioner to accept the State's plea offer rather than appealing the trial court's 
decision. Br. of Aplt at 24-34. Petitioner asserts that his counsel "should have known to 
take the issues of die fetal rights [sic] and the applicability of Section 202(1 )(b) on 
interlocutory appeal... or he could have preserved the issues in the record and filed a 
post-conviction appeal within the statutory period." Id. at 31. The post-conviction court 
correctly found, however, that Mr. McCaughey provided sound strategic advice and 
therefore denied petitioner's claim. 
!4 
'To show ineffective assistance of counsel, 4a defendant must show (I) that 
counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable 
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.'" Wickham v. 
Galetka, 2002 UT 72, f 19, 452 Utah Adv. Rep. 64 (quoting State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 
243 (Utah 1995)). "A [petitioner] cannot prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel where 'the challenged act of omission might be considered sound trial strategy.'" 
State v. Pecht, 2002 UT 41,1f 41, 48 P.3d 931 (quoting State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, f 10, 
4 P.3d 778)). 
By advising petitioner to accept the State's plea offer, Mr. McCaughey furthered a 
sound trial strategy of guaranteeing that petitioner would not face the risk of a death 
sentence. Prior to the State's plea offer, petitioner faced a substantial risk of receiving 
two death sentences. The trial court had denied his motions in which he contended that 
he should only face a simple murder charge because the State could not recognize a 
nonviable fetus as a person. R. 156-57, 167. Certainly petitioner could have appealed 
those rulings by either: (1) seeking an interlocutory appeal; (2) entering a conditional 
plea to the two aggravated murder charges that reserved his right to appeal the issue; or 
(3) proceeding with trial and then pursuing a direct appeal.2 Each option, however, posed 
a substantial risk that petitioner could receive two death sentences. 
2
 Petitioner did not argue below that his counsel was ineffective for failing to 
pursue a conditional plea. Rather, he only alleged that "defense counsel failed to appeal 
the denial of [petitioner's] motion or the Petitioner's conviction." R. 95. Accordingly, 
the argument that counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a conditional plea is 
unpreserved. 
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Seeking an interlocutory appeal posed a substantial risk because if petitioner lost, 
he would likely lose his opportunity for a plea bargain. There was no guarantee that this 
Court would have granted an interlocutory appeal. See Utah R. App. ?.5\In re: 
Discipline of Pendleton, 2000 UT 77, \ 36, 11 P.3d 284 ("when a litigant appeals from a 
nonfinal, interlocutory order, the appellate court's review of the appeal is discretionary"). 
Even assuming that this Court would have granted petitioner's request, there was a 
substantial risk that petitioner would not prevail. Several courts had already rejected the 
claim that Roe prevented a state from criminalizing the murder of a nonviable fetus.3 
Had he pursued an interlocutory appeal and lost, petitioner would have also lost any plea 
bargaining power he had. The State had a strong case against petitioner built primarily on 
his taped confession and eyewitness testimony. But without a decision from this Court on 
the applicability of die homicide statute to a nonviable fetus, petitioner could at least 
mount a non-frivolous attack on his convictions. An adverse ruling, however, would 
3
 State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 322 (Minn. 1990) ("Roe v. Wade protects the 
woman's right of choice; it does not protect, much less confer on an assailant, a third-
party unilateral right to destroy the fetus"); State v. Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d 286,291 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1997) ("The fact that a mother of a pre-bom child may have been granted certain 
legal rights to terminate the pregnancy does not preclude the prosecution of a third party 
for murder in the case of a killing of a child not consented to by the mother"); People v. 
Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 807 (Cal. 1994) ("Roe v. Wade principles are inapplicable to a 
statute . . . that criminalizes the killing of a fetus without the mother's consent"); People 
v. Ford, 581 N.E.2d 1189,1199 (111. App. Ct. 1991) ("a woman has a privacy interest in 
terminating her pregnancy; however, defendant has no such interest."); State v. Coleman, 
705 N.E.2d 419,421 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) ("[Roe] had nothing to do with the right of a 
third party to make [the] decision to terminate [a pregnancy]"); State v. Black, 526 
N.W.2d 132, 135 (Wis. 1994) (distinguishing between the termination of a pregnancy and 
an intentional criminal act); Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787, 791 (S.C. 
1996) (rejecting the argument that it was inconsistent to provide an action for the 
wrongful death of a fetus while also allowing an abortion to take place through the 
twenty-fourth week of a woman's pregnancy). 
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foreclose the possibility of such an attack and remove any motivation for the State to 
offer petitioner the opportunity to plead to a lesser charges. Thus, pursuing an 
interlocutory appeal posed a substantial risk that petitioner would lose his plea bargaining 
power and have no choice but to face the possibility of two death sentences. 
Entering a conditional plea or going to trial was just as risky. Had petitioner 
sought a conditional plea, he would have had to plead guilty to both aggravated murder 
charges. Nothing in the record suggests that the State would have offered anything less. 
Likewise, had petitioner chosen to go to trial he would have likely been convicted on both 
counts, given the strength of the State's case. Whether his conviction arose from his 
conditional plea, or a guilty verdict, petitioner would then have proceeded to a sentencing 
hearing where he faced the risk of two death sentences. He could then challenge the trial 
court's ruling on appeal, but the stakes would have been high. See footnote 3, above, and 
accompanying text. If he lost on appeal petitioner's convictions and sentences, which 
likely could have been death, would stand whether entered as a result of his conditional 
plea or a guilty verdict. Thus, any choice, other than accepting the State's plea offer, 
posed a substantial risk that petitioner could receive two death sentences.4 
Facing these options, Mr. McCaughey wisely counseled petitioner to accept the 
State's offer and forego an appeal of the trial court's ruling. As the post-conviction court 
concluded, Mr. McCaughey's advice was consistent with a reasonable and legitimate 
4
 Petitioner contends that his plea was coerced because he faced the threat of the 
death penalty unless he accepted the State's offer. Br. of Aplt. at 11. However, "a plea of 
guilty is not invalid merely because entered to avoid the possibility of a death penalty/' 
Brady v United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). 
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strategy of guaranteeing that petitioner would not face the risk of the death penalty. R. 
398. Such a strategic choice is the antithesis of ineffective assistance. Pecht, 2002 UT 41 
at U 41. Accordingly, the post-conviction court correctly denied petitioner's claim that 
Mr. McCaughey provided ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Petitioner complains that he faces a catch-22 because he has no available avenue 
of relief. Br. of Aplt. at 38-39. He explains that if the statutory challenge he asserted at 
trial is now procedurally barred (since his remedy at the time was to appeal the ruling), 
the post-conviction court cannot properly hold that Mr. McCaughey s advice to forego an 
appeal was a reasonable strategic choice. Id. The trial court's ruling does not create a 
catch-22, however, because petitioner has an available avenue of relief. 
Petitioner's avenue of relief is a post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. If the trial court had clearly committed reversible error in denying petitioner's 
motions, and Mr. McCaughey had advised petitioner not to appeal that decision, then Mr. 
McCaughey might well have been ineffective. See Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96, % 48, 
44 P.3d 626, (recognizing that counsel is ineffective if he overlooks a "dead-bang 
winning" appellate claim—a claim obvious on the trial record that would have resulted in 
reversal) (citing Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508, 1515 (10th Cir. 1995)). But the record 
of petitioner's case presents no such "dead-bang winning" claim, especially in light of the 
number of states that had resolved the precise issue contrary to petitioner's position. 
Thus, petitioner is not the victim of a catch-22 with no avenue for relief; rather, he is 
simply not entitled to relief upon his ineffective assistance claim. 
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III. THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER PETITIONERS 
UNPRESERVED VAGUENESS CLAIM; ALTERNATIVELY, 
PETITIONER WAIVED THE CLAIM BY PLEADING GUILTY; 
BUT IN ANY EVENT, PETITIONER FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE 
THAT THE STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE 
For the first time on appeal petitioner argues that the term ccunborn child" renders 
the homicide statute unconstitutionally vague. Br. of Aplt. at 14-15, 27-28, 36-38, 40. 
This court should decline to review this unpreserved claim because petitioner fails to 
argue any exception to the preservation rule. Even ignoring petitioner's failure to 
preserve the claim, this Court should nevertheless decline to review it because petitioner 
waived the claim by pleading guilty. But even ignoring petitioner's multiple waivers, his 
vagueness claim fails on its merits because he fails to demonstrate why an ordinary 
person would not understand that the term '"unborn child" includes a sixteen-to-eighteen 
week-old fetus, still in its mother's womb. 
A. The Court should decline to review petitioner's unpreserved 
claim because he does not argue that plain error occurred or 
that exceptional circumstances existed 
Petitioner failed to preserve his vagueness challenge. "As a general rule, claims 
not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 
74,H 11, 10 P.3d 346 (citing State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313, 318 (Utah 1998)). "[T]he 
preservation rule applies to every claim, including constitutional questions." Id. (citing 
Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996) (refusing to review a habeas 
petitioner's unpreserved constitutional claims)). In the trial court, petitioner did not claim 
that the homicide statute was unconstitutionally vague. R. 92-126. Rather, as discussed 
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above, he argued that Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and its progeny precluded the 
State from constitutionally recognizing a non-viable fetus as a human being or an unborn 
child. R. 100-07, 114. Consequently, petitioner may only raise his vagueness challenge 
if he can demonstrate that plain error occurred or that exceptional circumstances exist. 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at 111 (citing Monson, 928 P.2d at 1022). 
Petitioner fails to argue, let alone demonstrate, that either exception to the 
preservation rule is satisfied. Accordingly, this Court may decline to review his 
unpreserved vagueness claim. See State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, f 71,455 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 25 (declining to review an unpreserved claim where the party failed to argue plain 
error or exceptional circumstances); State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 
1995) (same). 
Even if this Court were to review petitioner's claim under the plain error or 
exceptional circumstances exceptions, the claim would fail. Exceptional circumstances 
arise only when "rare procedural anomalies" occur. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at f 12. 
There were no such "procedural anomalies" in the proceedings below. 
Nor could petitioner demonstrate that plain error occurred. To do so, he would 
have to show, among other tilings, that any error should have been obvious to the trial 
court. See Stale v. Dunn 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). An error is not obvious 
where there is no settled law on the issue. See State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 786 (Utah 
1992) (relying on the "clarity of the law in this area" to find that the error should have 
been obvious); State v. Frausto, 2002 UT App 259, f 12, 53 P.3d 486 ("'To show 
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obviousness of the error [Defendant] must show that the law was clear at the time of 
trial/^) (quoting State v. Garcia, 2001UT App 19, H 6, 18 P.3d 1123) (alteration in 
original). Petitioner acknowledges that this is an issue of first impression. Br. of Aplt. at 
14. Consequently, any error would not have been obvious to the trial court and the plain 
error exception would not excuse petitioner's failure to preserve the argument. See 
Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786. 
B. Petitioner's guilty plea waived his vagueness challenge-
Even ignoring petitioner's failure to preserve his vagueness claim below, petitioner 
cannot pursue the claim because he waived it by pleading guilty. Petitioner's guilty plea 
to one count of aggravated murder admitted the essential elements of that crime: that he 
killed two persons—Irene Christensen and her unborn child—during the same criminal 
episode. See State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989) ("by pleading guilty the 
defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the essential elements of the crime charged"). 
Because petitioner's guilty plea admitted all of the essential elements of the crime, the 
plea "waivefd] all nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea constitutional 
violations." See id at 1278. Therefore, petitioner's guilty plea waived any claim that the 
homicide statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him because his plea admitted 
that his conduct was prohibited by the statute. See id.; see also, United States v. 
Martinez-Martinez, 69 F.3d 1215, 1224 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding that a guilty plea waives 
any claim that a statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant's conduct); 
United States v. Burke, 694 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1982) (same); State v. Robinson, 618 
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N.W.2d 306, 311-12 (Iowa 2000) (same); People v. Brown, 506 N.Y.S.2d 483, 485 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1986) (same). 
Some courts have held that a facial vagueness challenge is not waived by a guilty 
plea. See, e.g., State v. LaRue, 619 N.W.2d 395, 397 (Iowa 2000) (holding that a guilty 
plea does not waive a challenge to the facial constitutional vagueness of a statute). This 
Court need not consider, however, whether petitioner can proceed with a facial vagueness 
challenge because he concedes that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague on its face. 
"In challenging [a statute] on its face, [petitioner] must show that it is 'invalid in 
toto - and therefore incapable of any valid application '" Greenwood v. City of North 
Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816,819 (Utah 1991) (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 145 U.S. 425, 
474 (1974)). Although petitioner declares at one point in his brief that die "homicide 
statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face," Br. of Aplt. at 14-15, he later concedes the 
facial validity of the statute by admitting that the term "unborn child" would not be 
unconstitutionally vague if applied to a viable fetus. Id. at 37-38. For example, petitioner 
admits that "[yjiability, as the point where the fetus can exercise and [sic] individual 
existence, is the logical point to confer the same rights as all of the other existent 
individuals." Id. at 37. He also asserts that Roe imposed a duty "on the State to justify 
an extension of the rights and protections of personhood to non-viable potential life." Id. 
Therefore, this Court should decline to review petitioner's claim because petitioner 
concedes the facial validity of the statute and has waived any as applied challenge by 
pleading guilty. 
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C. The homicide statute is not unconstitutionally vague because it 
prohibits the killing of any life within the womb, including a 
nonviable fetus, other than through a legal abortion. 
Regardless of petitioner's multiple waivers, his vagueness claim fails on its merits. 
Petitioner argues that the term '"unborn child" in the homicide statute is unconstitutionally 
vague because it is undefined, lacks a commonly accepted definition, and fails to give 
notice that the term includes nonviable fetuses. Br. of Aplt. at 27-28. Petitioner's claim 
fails because he reads the term "unborn child" in isolation, rather than in the context of 
the statute. He also fails to demonstrate why an ordinary person would not understand 
that a sixteen-to-eighteen week-old fetus, still in its mother's womb, is an '"unborn child." 
"
4A statute is not unconstitutionally vague if it is sufficiently explicit to inform the 
ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited/" State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, \ 13, 31 
P.3d 547 (quoting Bd. ofComm 'rs of the Utah State Bar v. Petersen, 937 P.2d 1263, 1267 
(Utah 1997)). A statute must also define an offense tuin a manner that does not 
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.'" Greenwood v. City of North Salt 
Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 
(1983)). A statute need not define an offense with "mathematical certainty," however. 
Grayned v. City ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972). Statutes may use terms "marked 
by 'flexibility and reasonable breadth, rather than meticulous specificity,'" as long as "it 
is clear what the ordinance as a whole prohibits." Id. (quoting Esteban v. Central 
Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1088 (8th Cir. 1969)). 
23 
When reviewing the constitutionality of a statute this Court "presumes that the 
statute is valid, a n d . . . resolvefs] any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality." 
Morrison, 2001 UT 73 at H 5 (quoting State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, f 6, 980 P.2d 191). 
Moreover, "this Court has a 'duty to construe a statute whenever possible so as to . . . 
save it from constitutional conflicts or infirmities.," Id. at 1|12 (quoting In re Marriage of 
Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, f 23,1 P.3d 1074) (internal quotation marks and additional 
citations omitted). "The plain language of a statute is to be read as a whole and its 
provisions interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the same statute." Lyon v. 
Burton, 2000 UT 55, f 17, 5 P.3d 616 (citing Roberts v. Erickson, 851 P.2d 643,644 
(Utah 1993)). Where possible, this Court will '"construe statutory provisions so as to 
give full effect to all their terms."' Id. (quoting Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 
1108, 1112 (Utah 1991)). 
Petitioner complains mat the statute is vague because it fails to define the point at 
which a life within the womb becomes an "unborn child." Br. of Aplt at 29. The statute 
clearly establishes, however, that an "unborn child" includes any life within the womb 
from conception to birth. The legislature placed no restrictions on the term "unborn 
child," and when read as a whole, it is clear that the term includes not only to viable 
fetuses, but also to nonviable fetuses that can be aborted. The statute states: 
(l)(a) A person commits criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, 
recklessly, with criminal negligence, or acting with a mental state otherwise 
specified in the statute defining the offense, causes the death of another 
human being, including an unborn child. 
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(b) There shall be no cause of action for criminal homicide for the death of 
an unborn child caused by an abortion. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201(l)(a) & (b) (1999). 
It is clear from the statute that an "unborn child" is any life within the womb from 
conception to birth because the legislature place no restrictions on the term '"unborn 
child." While it could have limited the term to an '"unborn quickened child" or an 
"unborn viable child," the legislature chose to use the unrestricted term. Thus, an 
ordinary reader would understand an "unborn child" to include any human life that has 
the potential to be bom; in other words, human life at any stage within its mother's 
womb. See Brinkley v. State, 322 S.E.2d 49, 53 (Ga. 1984) (recognizing that the 
unrestricted term "unborn child" "would clearly cover the entire period of pregnancy"). 
Furthermore, the context of the statute resolves any doubt about the scope of the 
term "unborn child." Because the statute creates an exception for the killing of an 
"unborn child" through an abortion, an ordinary reader would understand that an "unborn 
child" includes a nonviable life within the womb. Abortions most often involve a 
nonviable life. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869-70 (1992) 
(recognizing that a woman has a right to terminate her pregnancy prior to viability). If 
the statutory term "unborn child" did not include a nonviable life within its mother's 
womb, then the statute's exception for abortion would be meaningless. Therefore, 
reading the homicide statute as a whole, and giving effect to all of its terms, the statute is 
not unconstitutionally vague because an ordinary person would understand that it clearly 
prohibits the killing of any life in the womb, viable or not, unless through an abortion. 
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Petitioner contends that the term "unborn child" lacks a "general and commonly 
accepted definition." Br. of Aplt. at 36. On the contrary, Black's Law Dictionary defines 
"unborn child" as "[t]he individual human life in existence and developing prior to birth." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1524 (6th ed. 1990). This definition would include any 
developing human life within the womb at any stage. There is no need, however, to look 
to dictionaries to define the term "unborn child" because the context of the statute clearly 
establishes the term's scope. By leaving the term unrestricted and creating an exception 
for the killing of an unborn child through abortion, the legislature established that an 
"unborn child" included any human life within its mother's womb, regardless of viability. 
Petitioner argues that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because it could be 
interpreted to apply to stem cell research or the taking of a "day after" pill. Br. of Aplt at 
37-38. This Court need not consider these arguments, however, because petitioner has no 
standing to raise them. '"A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly 
proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of 
others.'" Greenwood, 817 P.2d at 820 (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,494-95 (1982)). The constitutionality of the 
homicide statute as applied to stem cell researchers or those who take a "day after" pill is 
not at issue. Rather, this Court must "*examine the [petitioner's] conduct before 
analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law.'" Id. Petitioner "must demonstrate 
that the ordinance does not provide [him] with adequate notice or that the ordinance could 
be arbitrarily enforced against [him]." Id. He fails to explain, however, why an ordinary 
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person would not understand that killing an '"unborn child" included killing a sixteen-to-
eighteen week-old child, still in its mother's womb, or how the homicide statute could be 
arbitrarily enforced against such an act. Accordingly, petitioner fails to demonstrate that 
the homicide statute is unconstitutionally vague. See id. 
Petitioner also asserts that State v. Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1978), compels 
the conclusion that the homicide statute is unconstitutionally vague. Br. of Aplt. at 27-30. 
In Larsen, the State charged the defendant with automobile homicide. 578 P.2d at 1280. 
While driving intoxicated and in excess of 100 miles an hour, defendant collided with a 
second car carrying a family of four, including a pregnant woman. Id. at 1281. The only 
fatality was the unborn child, which was approximately twenty-six weeks old. Id. 
Defendant moved the trial court to dismiss the charge of automobile homicide on the 
grounds that the State had failed to prove that the term "another" included an unborn 
child. Id. The trial court denied the motion. Id. 
This Court reversed. Id. at 1282. At the time, the automobile homicide statute 
stated in part, "[c]riminal homicide constitutes automobile homicide if the actor . . . 
causes the death of another." Id. The State urged this Court to find that the time had 
come to recognize an unborn child as a human being under the homicide statute, even 
though the legislature had not specifically recognized an unborn child as a human being. 
Id. This Court declined, stating that if the legislature wished to criminalize the killing of 
an unborn child, "it should do so in clear and specific language." Id. In 1983 the 
legislature amended the homicide statute to define homicide as the killing of "another 
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human being, including an unborn child." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201(1) (1978 & 
Supp. 1985 Compiler's Notes). It also added the exception for the killing of an unborn 
child through an abortion. Id. 
Petitioner claims that the legislature's inclusion of the term "unborn child" in the 
homicide statute is not die "clear and specific" language called for in Larsen. Br. of Aplt. 
at 28. As demonstrated above, however, the legislature's use of the unqualified term 
"unborn child" in the context of the homicide statute clearly designates as homicide the 
killing of any human life within its mother's womb, viable or not. Accordingly, Larsen 
does not compel the conclusion that the homicide statute is unconstitutionally vague. 
Nor does the recent amendment to the homicide statute indicate that the original 
statute is vague. In its 2002 general session, the legislature passed Senate Bill 178 which 
added to the homicide statute the language "at any stage of its development," after the 
term "unborn child." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201(l)(a) (Supp. 2002). This amendment 
does not expand the scope of the statute; it simply restates that an "unborn child" includes 
any human life in the womb from conception to birth. The amendment was unnecessary 
because, as discussed above, the original statute was clear. Nevertheless, the amendment 
conclusively resolves any future vagueness challenges to the term "unborn child." Thus, 
the amendment has the same effect as a decision from this Court finding that the original 
language of the homicide statute is not unconstitutionally vauge; both render the term 
28 
"unborn child" unassailable. Although the legislature could have waited for this Court to 
decide the issue, it chose to act first by amending the statute.5 
The legislative history of S.B. 178 indicates that the legislature did not amend the 
homicide statute out of a perceived need to remedy any vagueness in the term "unborn 
child" or to expand that term beyond its original scope. Rather, the legislature acted to 
make absolutely explicit what was already clear from the plain language and context of 
the homicide statute. Senator Poulton, the bill's sponsor, explained that the bill was 
intended to explicitly define the term "unborn child." He stated: 
Thank you Mr. President. This bill, i t . . . well let me explain in current 
law, it just clarifies current law. In current law the statute says that a 
person - I'm going to skip a little bit - a person commits criminal homicide 
if they cause the death of another human being including an unborn child. 
The problem we have is that "unborn child" is being challenged as being 
too vague and not specific enough. So this bill adds to that "at any stage of 
its development" should clarify any problems we have with that definition 
of "unborn child" that they're saying is vague. I'd be open to any 
questions. 
Recording of the Proceedings of the 54th Legislature, presentation of S.B. 178 to the Utah 
Senate, 28 February 2002, Day 40, Tape 45 (transcribed by Lee Nakamura, secretary, 
Utah Attorney General's Office) (emphasis added) (addendum B at 2). Additionally, in 
responding to a question about whether the bill was intended to challenge decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court regarding when life beings, Senator Poulton responded that 
the bill does not challenge those decisions, rather "[i]t just clarifies that the definition of 
an unborn child is "at any stage of its development," regarding criminal homicide." Id. 
5
 The State concedes that if the Court finds that the original statute was 
unconstitutionally vague, the amendment cannot apply retroactively to remedy the defect. 
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On the House floor, Rep. Gam described S.B. 178's effect as follows: 
I know that the bill came before us because of something that occurred up 
in Davis County. There was a homicide up there and a man allegedly shot 
his pregnant wife. And the judge ruled, in fact it was Judge Allphin up 
there, he ruled that the plain reading of Utah's law along with other uses of 
the term in the criminal code leads the court to conclude that at least in the 
narrow context of the Utah Criminal Homicide statute, the legislature 
intended to protect unborn children from the outset of the pregnancy. And 
that's how he interpreted the law and what this does is just make that 
interpretation very clear in the law. 
Recording of the Proceedings of the 54th Legislature, presentation of S.B. 178 to the Utah 
House of Representatives, 5 March 2002, Day 44, Tape 1 (transcribed by Lee Nakamura, 
secretary, Utah Attorney General's Office) (emphasis added) (addendum B at 3). 
Therefore, both Senator Poulton and Rep. Gam explained that the amendment was 
intended to explicitly state what was already clear from the plain language and context of 
the statute. 
This conclusion rings true for at least two reasons. First, the amendment passed 
both houses unanimously. See htQ>://www.le.state.ut.us/-2002/status/sbiUsta/sb0178.htm 
(visited 11 October 2002). Second, as discussed above, the amendment does not alter the 
meaning of the unamended statute, properly construed. Therefore, the amendment simply 
makes absolutely explicit what was already clear from the statute, thereby rendering the 
term "unborn child" unassailable. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons this Court should affirm the denial of the petition for 
post-conviction relief. 
Respectfully submitted this / 5 ~ day of October 2002. 
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Addendum A 
U.S. CONST, amend XIV, § 1: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201 (1999). Criminal homicide - Elements - Designations of 
offenses. 
(1) (a) A person commits criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, 
with criminal negligence, or acting with a mental state otherwise specified in the statute 
defining the offense, causes the death of another human being, including an unborn child. 
(b) There shall be no cause of action for criminal homicide for the death of an unbom 
child caused by an abortion. 
(2) Criminal homicide is aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, child abuse 
homicide, homicide by assault, negligent homicide, or automobile homicide. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-201, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-201; 1983, ch. 90, § 3; 
1983, ch. 95, § 1; 1991, ch. 10, § 7; 1991 (1st S.S.), ch. 2, § 1; 1995, ch. 291, § 6. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(l)(b) (1999). Aggravated murder. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated murder if the actor intentionally or 
knowingly causes the death of another under any of the following circumstances: 
(b) the homicide was committed incident to one act, scheme, course of conduct, or 
criminal episode dining which two or more persons were killed, or during which the 
actor attempted to kill one or more persons in addition to the victim who was killed; 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35(a)-106 (1996). Preclusion of relief- Exception. 
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that: 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion; 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or 
could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction 
relief; or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a basis 
that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure 
to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
History: C. 1953, 78-35a-106, enacted by L- 1996, ch. 235, § 6. 
Addendum B 
EXCERPTS FROM 54TH LEGISLATURE 
SENATE GENERAL SESSION 
February 28, 2002 
54th Legislature, Day 39, Tape 43 
CLERK, (reading from Standing Committee Report). "To Mr President The Human Services 
Committee reports a favorable recommendation on Senate Bill 178 'Protecting the Unborn 
Child' by Senator Poulton. Favorable on Senate Bill 181 'Higher Education Technology 
Amendment' by Senator Hillyard." . . . 
Senate Bill 178 Protecting the Unborn Child. Senator Poulton. 
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE: Senator Poulton? 
SEN. POULTON. Thank you Mr. President. Currently under state law an unborn child is 
protected if in the act of a crime its harmed or killed, has protection under state law, but it does 
say "unborn child." The defense attorneys are claiming that that's too vague. We have some 
court cases where they're appealing prosecution of perpetrators of crimes, judgements against 
them, because they're claiming "unborn child" is too vague. So this bill adds to the term 
"unborn child": "at any stage of its development" to clarify what we mean by the law. I'd accept 
any questions. 
PRESIDENT: Questions to Senator Poulton on this bill? 
SEN. POULTON: Call the question. 
PRESIDENT: The question is "Shall Senate Bill 178 be read for the third time?" Roll call vote. 
CLERK: (Roll is called) 
PRESIDENT: Senate Bill 178 has received 25 aye votes, no nay votes and 4 being absent passes 
to the Third Reading calendar. 
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SENATE GENERAL SESSION 
March 1,2002 
54th Legislature, Day 40, Tape 45 
CLERK. Senate Bill 178 Protecting the Unborn Child, Senator Poulton. 
PRESIDENT: Senator Poulton? 
SENATOR POULTON: Thank you Mr. President. This bill, i t . . . well let me explain in current 
law, it just clarifies current law. In current law the statute says that a person -I'm going to skip a 
little bit - a person commits criminal homicide if they cause the death of another human being 
including an unborn child. The problem we have is that "unborn child" is being challenged as 
being too vague and not specific enough. So this bill adds to that "at any stage of its 
development" should clarify any problems we have with that definition of "unborn child" that 
they're saying is vague. I'd be open to any questions. 
PRESIDENT: Senator Butters? 
SENATOR BUTTERS: Just one sentence -1 applaud this bill and think its great. 
PRESIDENT: Thank you. Senator Julander 
SENATOR JULANDER: Thank you Mr. President. Just a quick question, does this- - how does 
this relate to the Supreme Court ruling. Are we challenging mat? O r . . . 
SENATOR POULTON: What Supreme Court - - the court hasn't ruled on this. 
SENATOR JULANDER: When life begins and that sort of thing. Does i t . . 
SENATOR POULTON: On that issue, it doesn't have anything to do with it. 
SENATOR JULANDER: So it doesn't challenge that ruling. 
SENATOR POULTON: I don't think so. It just clarifies that the definition of an unborn child is 
"at any stage of its development" regarding criminal homicide. 
SENATOR JULANDER: OK. Thank you. 
PRESIDENT Any other questions? See none Senator. Are there enough senators here? OK. 
I'll call the question. The question is "Shall Senate Bill 178 pass?" Roll call vote. 
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES GENERAL SESSION 
March 5, 2002 
54TH Legislature, Day 44, Tape 1 
CLERK: Senate Bill 178 Protecting the Unborn Child, L. Stephen Poulton. 
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE: Representative Gam? 
REP. GARN: Thank you Mr. Speaker. Senate Bill 178 deals with the criminal code related to 
criminal homicide. And this act designates that a person may be found guilty of criminal 
homicide for the killing of an unborn child at any stage of its development. And the operative 
language, if you have the bill before you, is on page 1, line 16 and 17. And what this bill does is 
it conforms - - the current law - - what it does is it conforms current practice with law. So that's 
the intent of this and I'd be happy to answer any questions that you may have. 
SPEAKER: Further discussion to Senate Bill 178, Representative Daniels? 
REP. DANIELS: Thank you Mr. Speaker. May I ask the sponsor a question and reserve the 
right to an amendment? 
SPEAKER. The right will be so noted Representative Garn, will you yield? 
REP. GARN: Yes. 
SPEAKER: Proceed. 
REP. DANIELS: I'm wondering if there are any instances when there's been a problem with not 
being able to prosecute somebody because of the lack of this language. 
REP. GARN: I'm not aware of that. I know that the bill came before us because of something 
that occurred up in Davis County. There was a homicide up there and a man allegedly shot his 
pregnant wife. And the judge ruled, in fact it was Judge Allphin up there, he ruled that the plain 
reading of Utah's law along with other uses of the term in the criminal code leads the court to 
conclude that at least in the narrow context of the Utah Criminal Homicide statute, the legislature 
intended to protect unborn children from the outset of the pregnancy. And that's how he 
interpreted the law and what this does is just make that interpretation very clear in the law. 
REP. DANIELS: Mr. Speaker, I would like to propose an amendment to the bill. My 
amendment would be to eliminate the change on lines 16 and 17 and substitute instead the 
language "in the second and third trimesters of pregnancy." 
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SPEAKER. In the second and third'trimesters of pregnancy? 
REP. DANIELS: Right. 
SPEAKER: OK. We have that. Proceed. 
REP. DANIELS: Thank you. It seems to me that this change actually makes it more difficult to 
prosecute the crime because it makes it sort of vague. Its already a little vague, including 
"unborn children", but to say "at any stage of the development" - I assume that means any stage, 
even if the woman has, you know, been pregnant for 30 minutes. If that's the case it may be, it 
seems to me, more difficult for a prosecutor to make that proof than if we can just set a time line 
and say "its murder after this stage and its not murder before this stage", that gives them 
something that they can - - that's easily proven. And so I think it would actually improve the bill 
to tie it to a time line rather than requiring the prosecutors to either prove liability or prove 
pregnancy at that very early stage. That's my proposal. 
SPEAKER: Senate Gam, to the motion to amend? 
REP. GARN: I would resist the motion to amend I understand what Representative Daniels is 
trying to get at. He's trying to bring more clarity to something that may be a little unclear. 
However, my personal belief is that life begins at conception and I think that's when protection 
should begin. And therefore I would resist any effort to amend the bill. 
SPEAKER: Further discussion to the motion to amend? I'm going to clear the lights now. Now, 
those of you that want to speak to the motion to amend. Representative Buffinire to the motion 
to amend? No? Representative Throckmorton to the motion to amend? 
REP. THROCKMORTON: Thank you Mr. Speaker. I would also speak against this. We're not 
talking about abortion per se - the unborn, life of the unborn, and that's what we think about. 
We're not debating whether or not there should be an abortion. What we're debating is the 
protection of a child Now if a woman decides that she wants to have that child, abortion 
discussion entirely aside, then she should have that added protection. And if there is some 
conduct, illegal conduct that causes her to have a miscarriage or whatever it may be, that child 
needs to be protected And I believe the language here, it may not be perfect language, but 
certainly gets the intent of the legislature, the legislation, which is through aJl trimesters, not just 
the second and third 
SPEAKER: Further discussion, Representative Hutchings? 
REP. HUTCHINGS: Thank you Mr. Speaker. Will the maker of the amendment yield to a 
question? 
SPEAKER: Representative Daniels, will you yield? 
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REP DANIELS Certainly 
SPEAKER. Proceed. 
REP HUTCHINGS Representative Daniels, does subsection B under the first paragraph take 
care of the concerns that would be brought up about a first trimester? 
REP DANIELS No, subsection B relates to abortion. This statute doesn't have anything to do 
with abortion. This has to do with, for example, if you're in an automobile accident and you're 
criminally negligent and it happens to cause a miscarriage, then the person could be prosecuted 
not for just reckless driving or negligent homicide - - well, could be prosecuted for negligent 
homicide for the death of the fetus. It hasn't got anything to do with abortion at all. 
REP. HUTCHINGS. OK, if it has nothing to do with abortion, then why would be want to 
eliminate the first trimester9 If it were to cause a miscarriage in the second trimester then that's 
bad, but not in the first trimester? 
REP. DANIELS. Its bad no matter what. This doesn't have anything to do with abortion. And 
dividing the trimesters out is just an intention on my part to make the language clear so that a 
prosecutor can prosecute this crime and say its negligent homicide or its not negligent homicide 
without having to deal with proving something that may be very difficult for a prosecutor to 
prove. 
REP. HUTCHINGS: I see. Thank you. 
SPEAKER. Further discussion, Representative Harper was next. 
REP. HARPER: Thank you. I think the questions that I was going to ask have been answered 
but I really believe that if we're going to talk about the life of an individual, it should not be 
segmented into different trimesters. I believe we need to through and say what is right is right, 
what is wrong is wrong, what is murder is murder and I would urge your defeat of this 
amendment. 
SPEAKER. Representative Bush? 
REP BUSH: Thank you. Some of you may have noticed these little pair of feet on my coat. I 
have one on rny coat. This little pair of feet represents an unborn child at 10 weeks after 
conception. I also have a little pair of hands on one of my coats. That's to remind us that this is 
a person no matter how young they are. 10 weeks is younger than the second trimester that 
you're talking about and younger than this they're still a person. I don't know why we would 
say a small person that's only a little - - as big as your finger or something like that isn't as 
important as somebody that's just before birth or after they're born. They're still a person and 
this little pair of feet reminds me of this and it should remind others that this is a person we're 
talking about and I think we should certainly vote against this amendment and go along with the 
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bill Thank you. 
SPEAKER: I see no further lights. Representative Daniels, for summation on your motion to 
amend. 
REP DANIELS. Thank you Mr Speaker. I would just hope that we don't get this mixed up 
with a very motional debate about abortion because this statute doesn't have anything to do with 
abortion. I just think it clarifies it. I would ask you to support it. 
SPEAKER: Motion to amend is that we delete the language, the underlined language on lines 16 
and 17 and we insert the words "in the second and third trimesters of pregnancy." Those in 
favor of the Motion to Amend say aye. 
(A few voices: aye.) 
SPEAKER: Apposed say no. 
(More voices: no) 
SPEAKER: Motion fails. Motion foils. Further discussion? Representative Beck? 
REP. BECK. Thank you Mr. Speaker. Will the sponsor yield to a question'* 
SPEAKER: Representative Gam, will you yield? 
REP. GARN: Yes. 
SPEAKER. Proceed 
REP. BECK: Yesterday as I talked about my Medicaid spend down I told the body about having 
been brutally assaulted when I was 8 months pregnant with my second child. Now my child was 
not murdered in the altercation. However, many complications arose as a result of the 
altercation. The problem that we had when we went to criminal court is the fact that because my 
child was not declared a person, because he was still in utero, he had no rights, and Neil 
Gunnerson who was our attorney had to prosecute the damage that was done to me and my body, 
not to the baby. How would this legislation affect a situation like that? 
REP. GARN: Well, my personal belief, as you know representative Beck, I'm not an attorney, 
but I believe this legislation makes it very clear that we're going to protect life at any stage of its 
development. It doesn't matter which stage that is, we're going to protect it and that life has 
protection and how its going to play out with each individual case, I can't answer that, but I 
think this statute just makes it clear that from the moment of inception that that life's going to be 
protected - - conception rather. 
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REP BECK. Thank you. 
SPEAKER: Further discussion? See no further lights. Representative Gam, for summation on 
the bill. 
REP. GARN Representatives, this is a good piece of legislation. I think it clarifies a law that 
needs to be clarified. Life is sacred and from the moment that life begins it needs to be protected 
by government. That's what we do and that's what this law is all about so I would appreciate 
your support of this bill. 
SPEAKER: Voting is open on Senate Bill 178. 
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